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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT B. NIX, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden, Utah 
State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah* 
the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge, presiding, in which 
Robert B. Nix's petition for release on writ of haibeas 
corpus was denied. 
Case No. 
13855 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Thre respondent seeks the affirmance of the judg-
ment below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent rejects appellant's statement of facts 
and will restate them. 
Appellant entered a plea of guilty in the Second 
Judicial District Court of Weber County, State of Utah, 
to the crime of issuing a check against insufficient funds, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (1953), as amended, on May 
20, 1970. However, sentence was not passed at that time. 
On June 22, 1970, appellant, while personally present 
and represented by counsel, was placed under the super-
vision of the Adult Probation Departmenit, and as a 
condition thereof was to spend six months in the Weber 
County Jail. The jail term was not a sentence for the 
crime of issuing checks against insufficient funds, but 
was a specific condition of probation (R. 24, 35). On 
September 4, 1970, appellant was released from jail to 
the supervision of the Adult Probation Department and 
allowed to go to the State of Illinois. Probation was 
not terminated; rather, the appellant was allowed to go 
to Illinois under the provisions of the Interstate Com-
pact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationer, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-62-39 through 45 (1953), as 
amended; Illinois Ann. Statutes 38 § 1003-3-11 and 12, 
as amended (R, 36). Appellant, while under supervision 
in Illinois, breached the conditions of his probation, and 
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at the request of his probation supervisors in Illinois he 
was returned to Utah. Appellant's return to Utah was 
pursuant to the then applicable provisions of the afore-
mentioned Interstate Compact. On June 28, 1971, while 
present in Court and represented by counsel, appellant 
pied guilty to violating the terms of his probation (R. 
32, 33). Appellant was then sentenced upon his original 
plea of guilty to issuing a check against insufficient funds 
to a term in the Utah State Prison not to exceed five 
years (R. 34). Appellant was given credit for the six 
month term served as a condition of probation. Appel-
lant's sentence was according to then existing Utah law, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (1953), as amended 1969 (see 
1971 Supp.). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT'S RETURN TO UTAH WAS 
PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF THE "IN-
TERSTATE COMPACT FOR THE SUPER-
VISION OF PAROLEES AND PROBATION-
ERS." NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF 
APPELLANT WERE DENIED THEREBY. 
Appellant asserts that if the "Interstate Compact" 
did not require a formal adversary hearing prior to the 
removal of a parolee or probationer from a receiving state 
it amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of due 
process. Appellant's assertion is premised upon the claim 
that Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Constitution requires such a hearing. An analysis of the 
"Interstate Compact" and pertinent case law shows this 
assertion to be in error. 
The United Staites Supreme Court addressed a claim 
similar to appellants' in New York v. O'Neill, 359 U. S. 
1, 79 S. Ot. 564, 3 L. Ed. 2d 585 (1959). In that case a 
prospective witness challenged the provisions of the "Uni-
form Act to Secure the Attendance of Out-of-State Wit-
nesses" by claiming that it violated Article IV, Section 
2 of the United Staites Constitution. In effect, he claimed 
that the only constitutional means of securing his at-
tendance was through federally mandated extradition 
proceedings. The Supreme Court rejected his claim and 
upheld the Uniform Aet: 
"To argue from the declaratory incorpora-
tion in the Constitution, Art. 4, § 2, of the an-
cient political policy among the Colonies of de-
livering up fugitives from justice an implied de-
nial of the right to fashion other cooperative 
arrangements for the effective administration of 
justice, is to reduce the Constitution to a rigid, 
detailed and niggardly code. In adjudging the 
validity of a statute effecting a new form of re-
lationship between the states the search is not 
for a specific constitutional authorization for 
it. Rather, according the statute the full benefit 
of the presumption of constitutionality which is 
the postulate of constitutional adjudication, we 
must find clear incompatibility with the United 
State Constitution." Id. at 3 L. Ed. 2d 588. 
Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Con-
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stitution dbes not render invalid cooperative arrange-
ments between states which are distinct from extradition. 
It is to be emphasized that an Interstate Compact 
is not a unilateral or bilateral state action. Such a "Com-
pact," to become effective, must receive the approval of 
the United States Congress under the Constitution. The 
"Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and 
Probationers" was given congressional approval under 
an Act of June 6,1934. Title 4, U. S. C. A. § 111. 
The "Interstate Compact," as it existed in 1971 
when the appellant was taken from Illinois and returned 
to Utah, did not require any formal hearing prior to the 
retaking of a probationer or parolee. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-62-39 (c) and an analogous Illinois statute^ 38 § 
1003-3-11 (3), read in part: 
"Extradition, Waived, When: The duly ac-
credited officers of a sending state may at all 
times enter a receiving state and there appre-
hend and retake any person on probation or 
parole from such sending state. For that purpose 
no formalities will be required other than estab-
lishing the authority of the officer and the iden-
tity of the person to be retaken. All legal re-
quirements to obtain extradition of fugitives 
from justice are expressly waived on the part of 
state party hereto as to such person. The de-
cision of the sending state -to retake a person 
on probation or parole shall be conclusive and 
not reviewable within the receiving state; . . ." 
Only in 1973 did the receiving state become obli-
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gated to hold a hearing to determine whether a proba-
tioner or parolee had violated the conditions of his re-
lease prior to notifying the sending state of those viola-
tions. Utah Code Ann. § 77-62-46 (1973); Illinois Ann. 
Statutes 38 § 1003-3-11.4 (1973). 
The constitytionality of the Interstate Compact as 
it existed in 1971 had been tested and upheld in both 
state and federal courts. Ex parte Tenner, 20 Cal. 2d 
670, 128 P. 2d 338 (1942); Pierce v. Smith, 31 Wash. 2d 
52, 195 P. 2d 112 (1948), cert, denied, 335 U. S. 834, 69 
S. Ct. 24, 93 L. Ed. 387; Gully v. Apple, 213 Ark. 350, 
210 S. W. 2d 514 (1948); People ex rel. Rankin v. Ruth-
azer, 304 N. Y. 302, 107 N. E. 2d 458 (1952); United 
States ex rel. MacBlain v. Burke, 200 F. 2d 616 (3d Cir. 
1952); United States ex rel. Simmons on Behalf of Gray 
v. Lohman, 228 F. 2d 824 (7th Cir. 1955); Cook v. Kern, 
330 F. 2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1965); Curtis v. Bennett, 351 F. 
2d 931 (8th Car. 1965). See also 29 A. L. R. 2d 1088 and 
1128. 
In Gray v. Lohman, supra, a parolee advanced the 
same argument as appellant does in this proceeding: 
"Of the numerous contentions advanced by 
the petitioner the most important perhaps is 
that the compact provision is unconstitutional 
because it violates the provisions of Article IV, 
Section 2, Clause 2, of the Federal Constitution, 
concerning extradition, as well as Title 18, U. 
S. C. A. § 3182, enacted pursuant thereto. The 
contention appears to be that the constitutional 
provision on extradition places an absolute limi-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tation upon the power of the States to provide 
or arrange for the return of a person to a {3tiate 
from which such person is a fugitive from justice. 
We think there is little), if any, merit in this 
contention. In the first place, Congress evident-
ly thought that the Constitution placed no such 
inhibition upon the authority of the State to 
make agreements concerning persons on proba-
tion or parole because it exprescsly authorized 
the States to enter into such compacts. Title 
4 U. S. C. A. § 111. Moreover and perhaps more 
important is the fact that the constitutionality 
of similar compacts between other States, has 
been sustained." Id. at 826. 
That the Interstate Compact was valid in 1971 is 
not subject to doubt. The fact that in 1973 the Compact 
was amended to grant parolees and probationer a right 
to a hearing does not ipso facto imply that prior law was 
unconstitutional. Without a clear holding of unconsti-
tutionality no such presumption can be made. 
The removal of appellant from the State of Illinois 
did not violate existing constitutional due process norms. 
POINT II. 
EVEN IF THE APPELLANT'S REMOVAL 
FROM ILLINOIS COULD BE DEEMED 
TAINTED, ONCE INSIDE UTAH THE 
COURTS OF THIS STATE COULD CON-
STITUTIONALLY R E N D E R SENTENCE 
UPON HIM. 
Appellant contends that he was denied the right to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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habeas corpus in Illinois and that he was unlawfully sur-
rendered to Utah officers. Both of these contentions are 
unsupported by the record. There is no evidence to show 
that appellant sought habeas corpus relief and was de-
nied such a remedy; or that he was surrendefred to Utah 
officers in violation of Illinois law. 
Assuming arguendo that evidence did exist to show 
that appellant had been denied his right to challenge his 
removal by habeas corpus, that would not render invalid 
the sentence imposed and executed by the Utah courts. 
The Supireme Court of the United States has consistently 
held that due process is satisfied when one present in 
court is accorded constitutional procedural safeguards. 
The Court reiterated this policy in Frisbie v. Collins, 
342 U. S. 519, 72 S. Ct. 509, 96 L. Ed. 541 (1952): 
"This Court has never departed from the 
rule announced in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436, 
444, 30 L. Ed. 421, 7 S. Ot. 225, that the power 
of a court to try a person for crime is not im-
paired by the fact that he had been brought 
within the court's jurisdiction by reason of forci-
ble abduction. No persuasive reasons are now 
presented to justify ovemiing this line of cases. 
They rest on the sound basis that due process 
is satisfied when one present in court is con-
victed of crime having been fairly apprised of 
the charges against him and after a fair trial in 
accordance with constitutional procedural safe-
guards. There is nothing in the constitution that 
requires a court to permit a guilty person right-
fully convicted to escape justice because he was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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brought to trial against his will." Id. at 96 L. 
Ed. 545. 
See also Farrant v. Bennett, 347 F. 2d 390 (8th dr. 1965); 
United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F. 2d 583 (2d Cir. 1952); 
Johnson v. Mathews, 86 U. S. App. D. C. 376, 182 F. 2d 
677 (1950); Bullis v. Hocker, 409 F. 2d 1380 (9th Cir. 
1969); Hines v. Guthrey, 342 F. Supp, 594 (1972); and 
Johnson v. Buve, 312 F. Supp. 1349 (1970): 
"The federal constitutional provisions for 
extradition and the federal statutes implement-
ing them are not intended primarily to safeguard 
-the fugitive from justice, but rather to facilitate 
the discovery and bringing to speedy trial of 
fugitives from justice by the states." Id. at 
1350. 
"Once the accused has been brought within 
the custody of the demanding state, the legality 
of the extradition is no longer a proper subject 
of any legal attack by him." Id. ait 1351. 
Appellant's contentions that he was denied his right 
to habeas corpus and that he was unlawfully rdeased 
to Utah officers by the Illinois Mental Health Depart-
ment are rendered moot by appellant's sentence by a 
Utah court with jurisdiction over his person and pursu-
ant to constitutional procedural safeguards (R. 32, 33). 
POINT III. 
APPELLANT WAS LEGALLY PLACED ON 
P R O B A T I O N A N D L A T E R AFTER 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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BREACHING IT SENTENCED FOR THE 
CRIME OF ISSUING CHECKS AGAINST 
INSUFFICIENT FUNDS. 
The appellant after pleading guilty on May 20, 1970, 
was placed on probation on June 22, 1970. No other 
sentence was rendered at that time. The district court 
required as a condition of probation that appellant spend 
six months in jail: 
"THE COURT: All right, Mr. Bingham, 
we will try it. I will place Mr. Nix under the 
supearvision of the Probation Department, and 
one of the conditions of his probation will be a 
six-month jail sentence which will give you am-
ple time, if possible^ to work out some form of 
restitution" (R. 24, 35). 
The procedure of the district court in withholding sen-
tence until a later date is proper under Utah statute and 
case law. State v. Fedder, 1 Utah 2d 117, 262 P. 2d 753 
(1953); quoting from Utah Code Ann § 77-35-17 (1953), 
as amended: 
" 'Upon a conviction of any crime or offense, 
if it appears compatiible with the public interest, 
the court having jurisdiction may place the de-
fendant on probation for such period of time as 
the court shall determine.' The clear meaning 
of the words of the statute give the court the 
power to withhold sentence until such time as 
the court determines whether or not the prisoner 
is capable of rehabilitation and that this may 
be done upon a plea of guilty. In this case, the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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withholding of final judgment was not unreason-
able within the interpretation of the judgment 
statute, inasmuch as the court, preserved all the 
rights of the accused, with his consent, while 
attempting to give him the opportunity to re-
adjust himself to useful citizenship." Id. at 755. 
The requirement of Section 77-35-1 that judgment 
be imposed within two to ten days after the verdict has 
been held to be directory only, and the express ver-
balization of sentence is not necessary if probation is 
ordered. See State v. Saxtan, 30 Utah 2d 456, 519 P. 2d 
1340 (1974). 
POINT IV. 
APPELLANT WAS SENTENCED TO THE 
UTAH STATE PRISON FOR THE CRIME 
OF ISSUING CHECKS AGAINST INSUFFI-
CIENT FUNDS. 
The record shows that on June 28, 1971, the appel-
lant pled guilty to violating the terms of his probation 
(R. 33, 47). At that time appellant was sentenced upon 
his guilty plea of May 20, 1970, to the crime of issuing 
checks against insufficient funds, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2041 (1953), as amended 1969 (see 1971 Supp.), to 
a term in the Utah State Prison: 
"I sentence you to serve a term in the Utah 
State Prison not to exceed five years. He is to 
have credit for the six months which he has 
served" (R. 33, 34). (Emphasis added.) 
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Although the trial judge did not expressly state that 
the sentence was for the original guilty plea that conclu-
sion is inescapable. The sentence is in accordance with 
the sentence whidh appellant would have received had 
he not been placed on probation. Upon revocation of 
probation the applicable sentence was imposed as is the 
normal procedure in such drcumstances. To construe 
the Judge's sentence as one for a violation of probation 
only is to ignore the very concept of probation. 
POINT V. 
NO JUDICIAL ERROR OCCURRED IN 
T H E COMMITMENT OF APPELLANT. 
CHANGES IN APPELLANT'S COMMIT-
MENT ORDER CORRECTED CLERICAL 
ERROR ONLY. 
Appellant, while in court, and represented by coun-
sel, pled guilty to violating the teams of his probation. 
Appellant was then sentenced, as was previously men-
tioned^ to a tecrm not to exceed five years in the Utah 
State Prison for the crime of issuing checks against in-
sufficient funds. It is clearly evident that the commit-
ment order of June 28, 1971 is erroneous as it lists only 
appellant's guilty plea to probation wolation is to serve 
not less than five years. On June 29, 1971, a revised 
commitment order was issued to clarify both errors. 
Although this action may have been undertaken unilater-
ally (the revised order's printed section recites that ap-
pellant was present with counsel) the clarification di|d 
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nothing more than conform the document to what had 
actually transpired in court on June 28th when, as the 
record shows, appelant was in court and represented 
by counsel (R. 33). This change in the commitment 
order cannot be denominated other than a clerical error. 
The absence of appelant and counsel even if constituting 
error could not be deemed substantial error, which could 
be grounds for reversal. The result would not have been 
different had they been present. See Del Porto v. Nicolo, 
27 Utah 2d 286, 495 P. 2d 811 (1972); Arnovitz v. Telia, 
27 Utah 2d 261, 495 P. 2d 310 (1972); and Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure on Harmless Error. 
If the Court should determine that the sentence was 
erroneous, or erroneously altered, Utah law dictates that 
the district court does not lose its jurisdiction to pass a 
valid sentence upon a convicted party. See State v. Lee 
Lim, 79 Utah 68, 7 P. 2d 825 (1932): 
"The first sentence being void the jurisdic-
tion of the district court continued over the 
case and the prisoner until a valid sentence was 
imposed." (Page 826.) 
"There is no principle on which it can be 
successfully maintained that by serving part of 
a void sentence instead of appealing from it, 
but later attacking it in collateral proceedings, 
the defendant can obtain immunity from being 
sentenced to the judgment provided by law." 
(Page 826.) 
See also Ex parte Folck, 102 Utah 470, 132 P. 2d 130 
(1942). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, respondent submits that 
appellant was lawfully removed from the State of Illinois; 
lawfully sentenced for the crime of issuing checks against 
insufficient funds; and lawfully committed to the Utah 
State Prison, Wherefore, respondent respectfuly pnays 
that the judgment of the lower court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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